2026 Seminar Series

In this talk, I argue that Dietrich von Hildebrand, a student of Edmund Husserl (the father of phenomenology) and strident opponent of Nazism, provides a unique answer to the age-old question of how freedom, which seems to involve doing what we want without restraints, can be reconciled with morality, which imposes such restraints. This unique answer is best brought out in contrast to the more famous but problematic answer Immanuel Kant gives to the same question. Kant identifies freedom with autonomy, with the tragic consequence that freedom is either closed to the experience of the Other, or it becomes detached from morality, a law unto itself. By contrast, Hildebrand’s analysis of freedom shows that freedom is rather what I will term the autonomous assumption of heteronomy. Freedom is giving one’s fiat, “let it be,” to being moved by a potential motive that is essentially distinct from one, outside of oneself. This unifies freedom with affective love in a way that is not possible for Kant. For Hildebrand, freedom is ultimately found in self-donation and cooperation with the deepest stirrings of our heart, and, ultimately, the grace of God.